Ünal Çeviköz is a retired Turkish Ambassador and a former Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. He served as Turkey’s Ambassador to Azerbaijan (2001-2004), Iraq (2004-2006) and the United Kingdom (2010-2014). From 2007 to 2010, he was the Deputy Undersecretary for bilateral Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from 2013 to 2015 he was President of the 28th General Assembly of the International Maritime Organization. Retired from diplomatic service in 2014, Çeviköz has been a consultant, a member of several think-tanks as well as foreign policy columnist for various Turkish newspapers. In 2018, Çeviköz joined the Republican People's Party (CHP) and was elected an MP from Istanbul. He was also elected Vice President of Socialist International 2022 and maintains this position. He retired from active politics after the Turkish elections in 2023.
Sir Dominick Chilcott KCMG served as Britain's ambassador to Turkey from 2018-22, Ireland 2012-16 and (briefly) Iran 2011. He was the UK's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka and The Maldives in 2006-7 and deputy head of mission at the British embassy in Washington (2008-11). His previous postings were to the UK's Permanent Representation to the EU, Lisbon and Ankara. Sir Dominick now works as an independent consultant and member of the Ambassador Partnership, making use of his network of commercial, administration and other contacts in Turkey, Ireland and Sri Lanka. He is also the President of the British Institute of Archeology in Ankara.
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Bashar al-Assad’s flight to Moscow on December 8 marked the end of over a decade of civil war in Syria and 61 years of the Baathist regime. Turkey’s part in Assad’s overthrow and its influence in Syria are key issues for the country’s future.
Turkey played an active role in the Syrian crisis from the beginning of the civil war. Initially arguing for a balanced diplomatic solution to end the unrest, as Assad’s authoritarianism grew and the conflict escalated, Ankara shifted its stance to outright support for the opposition.
Having a border of over 900 kilometres with its southern neighbour, the instability created by Syria’s civil war affected Turkey directly and shaped Ankara’s policy towards the conflict.
First, the requirement to protect its national security prompted Turkey to take action in Syria against ISIS and the PKK, the two terrorist organisations that threaten the Turkish state. Tackling the PKK in Syria was complicated as the group, calling itself the YPG, had reinvented itself, with US support, as the major component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the international community’s boots on the ground in Syria in the fight against ISIS.
Second, the more than 4 million Syrian refugees inside Turkey had become an intolerable burden on the state’s resources and a cause of social tension. Opinion polls indicated that returning the refugees back to their homeland was the second most important issue for Turks after the high cost of living. Preventing any new flow of refugees and having a prospect that those Syrians in Turkey would return home soon became major concerns for Ankara.
To deal with those imperatives, Turkey established safe zones along the Syrian side of its border. Ankara aimed both to push the YPG back from Turkey’s frontier and to create an ordered space where some Syrians could be encouraged to return.
Military operations such as Euphrates Shield (August 2016 – March 2017), Olive Branch (January – March 2018) and Peace Spring (October 2019) led to Turkey’s establishing a significant military presence in northern Syria.
At the same time, in agreement with Russia and Iran, Turkey became in 2017 the defender of the last bit of Syrian territory in opposition hands, the north of Idlib, establishing military monitoring posts around the perimeter of the zone, deterring the Syrian regime’s forces from attacking and facilitating the supply of humanitarian aid. In return, Turkey undertook to remove HTS’ heavy weapons and prevent it operating south of the M-4 motorway.
This task, however, proved too difficult for Turkey to perform and HTS was able to develop its logistical networks, effectively under Turkish protection.
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) relationship with Turkey is complex. While Ankara has not directly supported HTS – its backing was reserved for the broad-based rebel coalition called the Syrian National Army - Turkey’s protection of opposition-controlled Idlib will have indirectly contributed to the group’s prominence.
As we now know, the end of the Assad regime happened swiftly. Israel’s military operations against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon shifted the focus of Iranian militias from Syria to Lebanon. Russia’s preoccupation with the Ukraine war added to Syria’s vulnerability. Deprived of the support of its two main allies, Syrian regime forces became easy prey. HTS seized the opportunity and launched its offensive. The isolated military forces of Syrian regime put up little resistance.
HTS’s control over a great part of Syria presents Turkey with new opportunities and risks.
On the one hand, the end of Assad’s rule could facilitate the voluntary and safe return of Syrian refugees. Turkey will probably seek international support for this process. Many thousands have already left to rediscover their old homes. However, if conflict and instability reignite, perhaps if ISIS re-emerges as a military power, Syrians will again seek refuge in Turkey in large numbers.
The new HTS government’s stance toward the YPG elements in northeastern Syria will heavily influence Turkey’s relations with Damascus.
The Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was the first foreign minister to visit the Syrian capital on 22 December to argue the case for the new Syrian administration taking over the ISIS camps and prisons in northeast Syria, a process that Ankara was ready to support. Mr Fidan later told the US Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, in a phone call that “the PKK/YPG terrorist organization cannot be allowed to take shelter in Syria.”
As an encouragement to the HTS government, Mr Fidan said all international sanctions imposed against Assad should be lifted as soon as possible to help Syria’s reconstruction. The minister offered Ankara's assistance. The Turkish construction industry undoubtedly has the capacity to play a major part in rebuilding Syria.
We can expect Turkey to closely monitor HTS’s efforts to gain international legitimacy and to develop a dialogue with Damascus aligned with its own interests.
The rise of HTS, with its roots in al-Qaida, necessitates a strategic recalibration not only for Turkey but also for regional and international actors. Turkey can position itself as a key player in guiding Syria’s transformation, addressing the country’s humanitarian crises and reconstruction efforts. If matters unfold optimally, Ankara may strengthen its partnerships with the U.S., the European Union, and Russia in so doing.
HTS’s ideological and military structure, however, may sound alarm bells in the Arab world, especially if the new regime in Syria is seen on the Arab street as a victory for political Islam. Turkey should support efforts to promote regional stability with active and balanced diplomacy.
The fall of the Assad regime has reshaped power dynamics in the region. With Assad gone, Turkey is probably the most influential regional actor in Syria. It seems inevitable that it will have a significant role in forging Syria’s future just as developments in Syria will have major effects in Turkey.
