GEOPOLITICS IN TURMOIL

February 2025 will be remembered as a very bad month for Europe and for the United States.  Much of the sound and fury has been over Ukraine and the wider implications for European security architecture. The potential Global ramifications are far wider.

In a recent contribution to AP Insights, Robert Hunter usefully set out the fundamental rationale for NATO and the realities in which the Alliance operates. He rightly says that NATO’s credibility ultimately depends on hard power and that in present (and hopefully future) circumstances its backbone is the US.  

As I said in these pages last December, there is a balance in the NATO Treaty between a solemn political commitment to defend the territory of NATO members and leaving each Ally maximum discretion as to how it carries out that commitment. That balance is based on a combination of solidarity (based on enlightened self-interest) and the statesman-like exercise of hard and soft power. We have not seen much of either from the Trump Administration in recent weeks.

The debacle in the Oval Office on 28 February was extremely damaging to everyone involved and to millions of people outside the room. It upset the careful diplomacy of President Macron and Prime Minister Starmer in the days immediately before. The impact on Ukraine is obvious. The fractious tone of the exchanges will have conveyed to most people outside the MAGA tent that the current US Administration is prepared to hector and bully its Allies in public, showing ‘respect’ only to itself (and its perceived great power prerogatives) but not to them. Most important of all, the use of (at best) dubious facts to justify some of the Administration’s arguments has seriously damaged the credibility of the United States as an international player. The pause in US military assistance to Ukraine announced on 3 March, surrounded as it was by quite personal statements critical of President Zelensky and of Europe, reinforces an impression of predatory bullying. Some commentators are wondering whether the Administration might be prepared to do the same to Taiwan. It is, after all, not what you say but what others hear.

We must now await developments following President Trump’s speech to Congress on 4 March.  To maximise the changes of a successful negotiation it is vital that US military aid to Ukraine should be resumed quickly.

The fundamental strategic issue for Europe is whether the US under Trump can any longer be considered a reliable Ally. In the shorter term there are questions over whether the Trump Administration can now take on the role of a viable and non-partisan negotiator on Ukraine.  Europe including the UK need to hope for the best but plan for the worst.

As Robert Hunter points out, a reduced commitment to European security will put at risk the strength and vibrancy of transatlantic economic relations, without which the US economy cannot thrive. So the first step should be to try and mend fences with the US and capitalise on the commitment to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty given by President Trump to Prime Minister Starmer on 27 February.  

In an ideal world the four-point agreement announced at the London Summit should be a helpful step forward towards mending fences. Taken at face value, the London commitment to aim to deter any future Russian invasion and to form a ‘coalition of the willing’ to defend Ukraine and guarantee peace there is pretty much what the Trump Administration has been asking for.  But it will be difficult to carry through, and Russia is currently ruling out European participation in any force sent to Ukraine. It is also stepping up its attacks on the country and planning further mobilisation. There will be questions in US minds about how a European force will be delivered and the input it will need from the US in military or other ways. Statements on 3 March from President Trump and Vice President Vance criticising European weakness are one manifestation of this. However, at present Europe on its own cannot guarantee Ukraine’s security militarily, and there is no reason to expect it to be able to do so in the short or medium term. That is not a sign of weakness but an acknowledgment of reality.

Keeping military aid flowing into Ukraine is fundamental and has become a vital and pressing issue. It is encouraging that European money is continuing to flow and that further serious thought is being given as to how more can be found.

Having Kyiv at the table for any peace talks may prove to be more difficult despite the obvious fact that all parties to a dispute need to negotiate to settle it and that a durable outcome must reflect their interests.  Prime Minister Starmer and President Macron have emphasised that Europe is not trying to muscle the US out of the way. But it is important in current circumstances to insist that both Europe and the UK (as key stakeholders) and Ukraine are closely involved in the negotiations.

There are good reasons why diplomatic negotiations are organised and conducted differently from commercial deal-making. They deal with war, peace and economic relations and can impact very directly on people’s lives as well as governments. It is particularly important that outcomes should be durable. That requires developing respect and trust among all sides, both of which seem currently in short supply. Although diplomatic negotiations can be slower and more frustrating than anyone might like, they are worth it if the outcome sticks. As a first step, Europe should insist that Oval Office negotiations in front of the cameras stop.

So far President Trump’s efforts have yielded little concrete, even if we can all share his objective of ending the war. The real question, however, is on what terms. So far, the US seems to have concentrated on twisting Ukraine’s arm with little apparent effort to apply equivalent pressure on Russia. The Russian position remains as hard as ever despite its clear responsibility for the conflict.  That cannot be a sustainable basis on which to negotiate with an aggressor.

At the right time, and if Russia is prepared to engage, there is much to be said for putting in place a more formal negotiating structure.  Key informal contacts will of course continue in the margins, but there is a strong case for having the US, Russia, Ukraine and representatives of the ‘coalition of the willing’ around the table. There may also be a case for appointing a neutral and respected figure acceptable to all to manage the process.  

It is now incontestable that Europe will need a step-change in defence expenditure irrespective of the outcome on Ukraine. It is not unreasonable, as President Trump has suggested, to aim for 4 or even 5% of GDP; the increases so far announced by the UK and others are most unlikely to be sufficient. This will mean hard budgetary decisions for many countries. A long hard look should be taken at simplifying cumbersome defence procurement processes to cut costs and involve smaller more agile companies in delivering technological military innovation.

Since Putin’s aggression is the root cause of the current situation, it would not be inappropriate to confiscate frozen Russian assets to help pay the defence bill and support Ukraine both militarily and economically. Russian money will also be needed to repay British and European businesses whose assets have been damaged by the war or confiscated unjustly by the Russian government.

Finally, it is welcome that the President of the European Commission has tabled a plan to ‘re-arm Europe’. However, there are strong arguments for grounding an increased European defence contribution in a NATO rather than EU context. These include the need to keep the US involved in European Security and to avoid the institutional complications of involving countries such as the UK (post-Brexit), Canada and Turkey in EU defence structures. If the US under Trump continues to retreat from its traditional NATO role it should be possible to make changes in Alliance structures to give the European element more weight.

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